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1. Background 
The dispute between Argentina and Uruguay arose out of the authorizations 
given by Uruguay in 2002 for the construction of a pulp mill (the CMB (ENCE) 
project), and in 2003 for the construction and commissioning of another (the 
Orion (Botnia) mill) both on the banks of the River Uruguay, a shared natural 
resource and the common border between these countries. 
The boundary between the two States is defined by the bilateral 
Montevideo Treaty of 7 April 1961. According to Article 7 of this Treaty, the 
parties were to establish a “regime for the use of the river”. The said regime was 
subsequently established through the signature of the Statute of the River 
Uruguay on 26 February 1975 (the 1975 Statute). The latter sets up the 
Administrative Commission of the River Uruguay (the CARU), which is 
responsible for the gathering and evaluation of information and notifications 
provided by the parties concerning any project on the river that may have an 
impact on it. The CARU also elaborates rules in many areas associated with the 
joint management of the river. 
An attempt was made by the Presidents of the two States to resolve the 
dispute in May 2005 by creating a High-Level Technical Group (GTAN), which 
was supposed to accomplish its mission within a period of 180 days. In January 
2006, Uruguay declared this negotiation process a failure. Argentina followed suit 
in February 2006.  
In May 2006, Argentina instituted proceedings against Uruguay before the 
International Court of Justice concerning a breach of obligations under the 1975 
Statute. According to the application, this breach arose out of the authorizations 
mentioned above with reference in particular to “the effects of such activities on 
the quality of the waters of the River Uruguay and on the areas affected by the 
river”. As the CMB (ENCE) project was abandoned in September 2006, the 
Orion (Botnia) mill was the only plant concerned in the dispute.  
Argentina submitted a request for the indication of provisional measures, 
asking the Court to suspend authorization and construction of the pulp mill. 
Another request for the indication of provisional measures had been introduced 
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by Uruguay, in order to remove protesters who were blockading bridges across 
the river. The Court rejected both requests, on 13 July 2006 and 23 January 2007 
respectively, on the basis that there was no urgent need for such measures. 
 
 
2. Materials and Links 
- International Court of Justice, Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay 
(Argentina/Uruguay), Judgment of 20 April 2010 
(http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/15877.pdf); 
- Joint dissenting opinion of Judges Al-Khasawneh and Simma  
(http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/15879.pdf); 
- Separate opinion of Judge Keith 
(http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/15881.pdf); 
- Declaration of Judge Skotnikov 
(http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/15883.pdf); 
- Separate opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade 
(http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/15885.pdf); 
- Declaration of Judge Yusuf 
(http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/15887.pdf); 
- Separate opinion of Judge Greenwood 
(http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/15889.pdf); 
- Separate opinion of Judge ad hoc Torres Bernárdez 
(http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/15891.pdf); 
- Dissenting opinion of Judge ad hoc Vinuesa 
(http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/135/15893.pdf). 
 
 
3. Analysis 
Argentina claimed that Uruguay had breached the following obligations under the 
1975 Statute: to take all necessary measures for the optimum and rational 
utilization of the river; to notify CARU and Argentina of any projects affecting 
the river; to comply with the procedures set out in Chapter II of the 1975 Statute 
(regarding works liable to affect the regime of the river or the quality of its 
waters); to take all necessary measures to preserve the environment, prevent 
pollution, and to protect biodiversity, including the preparation of a full and 
objective environmental impact study; and to cooperate in preventing pollution 
and protecting the environment and fisheries. Argentina requested that Uruguay 
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cease its wrongful conduct, comply with its obligations, re-establish “on the 
ground and in legal terms” the situation that existed previously, and make 
reparations for injury caused by its breach (paragraph 22 of the Judgment). 
Uruguay argued that Argentina had failed to demonstrate “any harm, or 
risk of harm, to the river or its ecosystem resulting from Uruguay’s alleged 
violations of its substantive obligations under the 1975 Statute that would be 
sufficient to warrant the dismantling of the plant”. It also argued that dismantling 
the plant would have substantial consequences on Uruguay’s economy in terms 
of lost jobs and revenue, and as such would be disproportionately onerous. 
Uruguay asked the Court to limit any remedy provided to a declaratory judgment, 
an order to take additional environmental protective measures found to be 
necessary to ensure that the plant conforms to the obligations of the 1975 
Statute, a requirement to pay monetary compensation to Argentina where 
damage has occurred to the river and, finally, a declaration making clear that the 
Parties are obliged to ensure full respect for all the rights in dispute in the case, 
including Uruguay’s right to continue operating the plant in conformity with the 
provisions of the 1975 Statute (paragraph 23). 
The reasoning of the Court is divided into two parts. It first analyzed the 
alleged breach of procedural obligations, leaving consideration of the substantive 
obligations to the second part of its judgment. The reason for this division in the 
reasoning of the Court stems from the fact that nowhere in the 1975 Statute is it 
written that “a party may fulfill its substantive obligations by complying solely 
with its procedural obligations, nor that a breach of procedural obligations 
automatically entails the breach of substantive ones” (paragraph 78). It 
recognized a “functional link” between the two categories but held that this did 
not prevent the States parties from being required to abide by those obligations 
separately, and to assume responsibility for any the breach of either set 
(paragraph 79). Judges Al-Khasawneh, Simma and Vinuesa criticized such a 
separation in their respective dissenting opinions. In their opinion, where 
procedural obligations are essential to protect the environment, a finding of the 
violation of these obligations should also affect any conclusion as to the breach 
or otherwise of substantive obligations (paragraph 26 of the joint dissenting 
opinion of Judges Al-Khasawneh and Simma; paragraph 4 of dissenting opinion 
of Judge ad hoc Vinuesa). 
With respect to the procedural obligations, the Court examined the alleged 
breaches on the part of Uruguay of, first, the obligation to inform CARU and, 
second, the obligation to notify Argentina about the two planned pulp mills. With 
regard to the former, the Court noted that it constituted “the first stage in the 
procedural mechanism as a whole which allows the two parties to achieve the 
object of the 1975 Statute, namely, the optimum and rational utilization of the 
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River Uruguay” (paragraph 94). According to Article 7 (1) of the 1975 Statute, 
the State that is initiating activity has to inform CARU in order to allow the 
Commission to determine whether the planned activity might cause significant 
damage to the other Party. The State intending to undertake certain activities is 
required to inform CARU as soon as it is in possession of a plan that is 
sufficiently developed to enable CARU to make a preliminary assessment 
(paragraph 105). For the Court, the obligation to inform CARU is linked to the 
fulfillment of the obligation of prevention (paragraph 102), according to which 
every State has the obligation not to knowingly allow its territory to be used for 
acts contrary to the rights of other States. States must therefore use all the means 
at their disposal in order to avoid activities on their territory that cause significant 
damage to the environment of other States (paragraph 101).  
The Court found that Uruguay did not transmit to CARU the information 
required by the 1975 Statute, despite being requested to do so by the 
Commission on several occasions (paragraph 106). Consequently, Uruguay, by 
not informing CARU of the planned works before the issuing of the initial 
environmental authorizations for each of the mills and for the port terminal 
adjacent to the Botnia mill, failed to comply with this first procedural obligation 
(paragraph 111).  
With respect to the second procedural obligation, Article 7 (2) of the 1975 
Statute prescribes that if CARU decides that a plan might cause significant 
damage to the other Party or if a decision cannot be reached in that regard, the 
Party concerned shall notify the other Party of this plan through the said 
Commission. Under Article 7 (3), this notification must describe the main aspects 
of the intended activities, and any other technical data that will enable the 
notified party to assess the probable impact of such works on navigation, the 
regime of the river or the quality of its waters (paragraph 112). The obligation to 
notify “is intended to create the conditions for successful cooperation between 
the parties, enabling them to assess the plan’s impact on the river and, if 
necessary, to negotiate the adjustments needed to avoid the potential damage that 
it might cause” (paragraph 113). Given the importance of the notification 
procedure, the Court concluded that it must take place before the State 
concerned decides on the environmental viability of proposed activity, in light of 
the required environmental impact assessment (paragraph 120).  
The Court found in the present case that Uruguay had failed to notify 
Argentina through the CARU as required, only transmitting the necessary 
information after having issued the initial authorizations for the two mills 
(paragraph 121). As a consequence, the Court concluded that Uruguay had failed 
to comply with its obligation to notify the plans to Argentina through CARU.  
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After having analyzed the procedural obligations, the Court turned to the 
allegations concerning the breach of substantive obligations arising under the 
1975 Statute.  
As a preliminary issue, the Court addressed the burden of proof. Argentina 
argued that the precautionary approach of the 1975 Statute obligated Uruguay to 
bear the burden of proving that the Orion (Botnia) mill would not significantly 
damage the environment. The Court rejected this view and recalled that it is 
incumbent on a party asserting a fact to establish its existence (paragraph 162). 
This approach was criticized by Judges Al-Khasawneh and Simma. In their view, 
the Court erred in its reliance on the traditional rules of the burden of proof, by 
obliging Argentina to substantiate claims on issues that the Court could not fully 
comprehend without recourse to an expert assessment (paragraph 5 of the joint 
dissenting opinion of Judges Al-Khasawneh and Simma). 
The first substantive obligation to be analyzed by the Court concerned the 
optimum and rational utilization of the river, set out in Article 1 of the 1975 
Statute. According to Argentina, Uruguay breached this obligation by failing to 
coordinate with them on measures necessary to avoid ecological change and by 
failing to take the measures necessary to prevent pollution. This obligation is to 
be achieved by complying with the obligations prescribed by the 1975 Statute for 
the protection of the environment and the joint management of the shared 
resource. However, the Court stated that while this objective “informs the 
interpretation of the substantive obligations, it does not alone lay down specific 
rights and obligations for the parties” (paragraph 173). In order to meet this 
objective, a balance must be found “between the Parties’ rights and needs to use 
the river for economic and commercial activities on the one hand, and the 
obligation to protect it from any damage to the environment that may be caused 
by such activities, on the other” (paragraph 175). 
The second substantive obligation concerned ecological balance. Argentina 
argued that Uruguay had violated Article 36 of the 1975 Statute, which places the 
Parties under an obligation to coordinate through CARU in respect of ensuring 
that the measures necessary to avoid altering the ecological balance of the river 
are in place. According to this obligation, both States have to take positive steps 
to avoid changes in the ecological balance. These steps include not only the 
adoption of a regulatory framework, but also the observance as well as 
enforcement by both Parties of the measures adopted (paragraph 185). Both 
Parties are required, under Article 36, to exercise due diligence in acting through 
CARU in establishing and enforcing the necessary measures to preserve the 
ecological balance of the river (paragraph 187). Argentina did not succeed in 
demonstrating that Uruguay had refused to engage in such coordination.  
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Argentina also claimed that Uruguay, “by allowing the discharge of 
additional nutriments into a river that is eutrophic and suffers from reverse flow 
and stagnation”, had violated the obligation to prevent pollution under Article 41 
of the 1975 Statute. Uruguay responded that the plant complied with applicable 
laws and regulations and that it met the best-available-technology standards. 
According to Article 41, the Parties have to adopt legal rules and measures “in 
accordance with applicable international agreements” and “in keeping, where 
relevant, with the guidelines and recommendations of international technical 
bodies” in order to protect and preserve the aquatic environment and to prevent 
pollution (paragraph 195). The Court adjudged that the question of Uruguay’s 
alleged breach of its obligation to prevent pollution should be measured against 
the 1975 Statute, the positions and rules coordinated with Argentina through 
CARU, and the regulations adopted by each party (paragraph 200). 
The Court then addressed the practice of conducting environmental impact 
assessments (EIA). It held that, given that it “has gained so much acceptance 
among States [...] it may now be considered a requirement under general 
international law to undertake an environmental impact assessment where there 
is a risk that the proposed industrial activity may have a significant adverse 
impact in a transboundary context, in particular, on a shared resource” 
(paragraph 204). Defined by the Espoo Convention as “a procedure for 
evaluating the likely impact of a proposed activity on the environment” (1991 
Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, 
Article 1(vi)), an EIA aims to inform national decision-makers about possible 
risks to the environment when deciding whether to authorize an activity. As 
required by Uruguayan law for this kind of project, EIAs were conducted. More 
precisely, one EIA was conducted by Botnia, the company that owned the plant, 
as well as two by consultants acting for the International Finance Corporation, 
which funded the construction. According to Argentina, however, these 
assessments did not satisfy international standards with regard to the choice of 
the location of the plant and public consultation. The Court found yet the EIAs 
to be satisfactory on these two points.  
Another aspect of the obligation to prevent pollution and protect and 
preserve the aquatic environment concerned the technology to be used by the 
mills. According to Argentina, Uruguay must make sure that the pulp mills use 
the best available technology in order to comply with its obligations. Argentina 
claimed that Uruguay had failed to take all measures to prevent pollution by not 
requiring the mill to employ the best available techniques. The Court agreed with 
this requirement but found no evidence to support the allegation of violation in 
this case (paragraph 228).  
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The Court finally assessed the impact of the discharges on the quality of 
the water of the river. It found that there is “no conclusive evidence in the record 
to show that Uruguay has not acted with the requisite degree of due diligence or 
that the discharges of effluent from the Orion (Botnia) mill [...] have caused harm 
to living resources or to the quality of the water or the ecological balance of the 
river since it started its operations” (paragraph 265).  
The Court also stated that, under the 1975 Statute, both parties have an 
obligation to continue their co-operation through CARU, to enable it to devise 
the necessary means to promote the equitable utilization of the river, while 
protecting the environment (paragraph 266). 
The Court criticized the way both parties had used experts. According to 
the Statute and the Rules of the Court, the parties and the Court may examine 
expert testimony. However, both parties to this case chose to present their 
experts as counsel. They were not subject to questioning either by the Court or 
the other party. The Court considered that “those persons who provide evidence 
before the Court based on their scientific or technical knowledge and on their 
personal experience should testify before the Court as experts, witnesses or in 
some cases in both capacities, rather than counsel, so that they may be submitted 
to questioning by the other party as well as by the Court” (paragraph 167). 
 
 
4. Issues: Environmental Impact Assessment and Consultation of Affected Populations  
One of the main outcomes of the Pulp Mills case is the recognition, for the first 
time, of a customary international law requirement to conduct transboundary 
EIAs in order to protect and preserve the environment. The Court noted that 
even though there was no explicit reference to such a requirement in the 1975 
Statute, the Parties were obliged to conduct an EIA in order to properly comply 
with their obligations under Article 41(a) and (b) of the Statute. In all likelihood, 
persuaded by the consensus on the part of both parties as regards the need for an 
EIA, the Court employed an evolutionary interpretation of the treaty based on 
the fact that “there are situations in which the parties’ intent upon conclusion of 
the treaty was, or may be presumed to have been, to give the term used – or 
some of them – a meaning or content capable of evolving, not one fixed once 
and for all, so as to make allowance for, among other things, developments in 
international law” (paragraph 204). According to the Court, the conduct of an 
EIA is to be understood as one element of the general obligation of due diligence 
in the prevention and control of transboundary harm (paragraph 204). 
The process to be followed for carrying out an EIA cannot be found in any 
international instruments. In practice, this process can take many forms 
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depending on the specifics of the proposed activity. It would normally take place 
before authorization is granted, but it can also happen in several stages. In some 
complex projects implying a long period of time between initial authorization and 
operation, it may be necessary to conduct numerous EIAs or to review the initial 
EIA before the commencement of operations. The Court gave two important 
points of guidance on the process to be followed: the EIA must be conducted 
prior to the implementation of a project and, thereafter, continuous monitoring 
of the environmental effects must be undertaken (paragraph 205).  
The Court observed, however, that neither the 1975 Statute nor general 
international law specify the scope and the content of the required EIA, and 
leaving each State to determine such content in its domestic legislation or in the 
authorization of the project, “having regard to the nature and magnitude of the 
proposed development and its likely adverse impact on the environment as well 
as to the need to exercise due diligence in conducting such an assessment” 
(paragraph 205). As noted by Alan Boyle, two important points can be extracted 
from this statement. First, the Court made clear that an EIA does not need to be 
required specifically by law but can be also required as part of the authorization 
process. There are means to make sure that an EIA is carried out even in this 
absence of formal legal requirements. Second, there is an obligation to take into 
account “the nature and magnitude of the proposed development and its likely 
adverse impact on the environment” while processing the EIA. Even if the Court 
left the “specific content” of each EIA for the State to determine, there is now a 
“minimum” imposed by international law. If national law does not ensure that an 
assessment of the possible effects on people, property and the environment of 
other States likely to be affected is carried out, a breach of an international 
obligation will follow.  
Another important aspect concerns the threshold that determines whether 
an EIA is necessary. The level of this threshold may be determined taking into 
account two different sets of factors, which relate to the potential for, and the 
potential gravity of, pollution. Most of the international instruments that make 
provision for EIAs call for a low threshold in terms of potential for pollution. In 
other words, an EIA would be required even if pollution is possible or likely to 
be caused as a result of the proposed activity. The Rio Declaration, for example, 
calls for an EIA wherever the “proposed activities [...] are likely to have a 
significant adverse impact on the environment” (Principle 17 of the Rio 
Declaration). The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea also requires merely 
“reasonable grounds for believing that planned activities [...] may cause 
substantial pollution of or significant harmful changes to the marine 
environment” (Article 206 of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea). 
In this case, the Court adopted a similar approach by stating that an EIA is 
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necessary “where there is a risk that the proposed industrial activity may have a 
significant adverse impact in a transboundary context, in particular, on a shared 
resource” (paragraph 204).  
This judgment, a “landmark for international environmental law”, is 
somewhat diluted by the fact that the Court failed to recognize the existence of 
an obligation of public consultation. As noted by C. R. Payne, the direct impact 
of such recognition would have been to provide any project opponents with a 
means of establishing in advance that a proposed riparian economic development 
project would have harmful effects. The Court expressed the view that the parties 
had no international legal obligation to consult the populations affected by the 
approval and construction of the mills (paragraph 216). However, it nevertheless 
specified that this view was based on the instruments invoked by Argentina. In 
order to demonstrate the existence of such an obligation, Argentina had invoked 
Article 2(6) and 3(8) of the Espoo Convention, Principles 7 and 8 of the UNEP 
Goals and Principles and Article 13 of the International Law Commission 2001 
Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities 
(paragraph 215). The Court rightly considered that the Espoo Convention did 
not impose any obligation in the present case, as neither State was a party to it; 
however, its reasons for rejecting the relevance of the other two instruments 
deserve further consideration.. As noted by Owen McIntyre, the Court appeared 
in the same judgment (paragraph 210) to consider the UNEP instrument relevant 
in rejecting the existence of a binding legal requirement to consider alternatives 
to the planned project in the conduct of an EIA. MacIntyre further argued that 
the decision of the Court to reject the relevance of the ILC Draft Articles was 
confusing, given the role of the ILC in the codification and progressive 
development of international law. The position of the Court must, however be 
understood in light of the fact that, in the present case, a consultation by Uruguay 
did take place. A formal recognition by the Court that such a crucial procedural 
obligation – already imposed by various international law instruments – exists as 
a matter of general international law is thus most probably for another day.  
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